

Parasitizing Human Security Norm? Analysis of the Philippines Government's References to Human Security¹

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Abstract

While the international community has been making efforts to realize human security, governments of Southeast Asian countries have rarely referred to human security or promoted policies to realize it. However, the Philippine government enacted the Human Security Act in 2007 and frequently refers to the concept of human security in its military policy plans. This paper aims to understand the reasons for this as well as what implications it may have.

To do so, the paper introduces the concepts of norm breeding and norm parasitizing. It has been pointed out and studied that when norms diffuse globally, they are localized in order to adapt them to the local context. However, viewing the implications and reasons behind the Philippines' references to human security as localization seems to miss the point. This paper argues that the Philippines' use of the term human security with its own, unique meaning is not an attempt to localize, but rather an attempt to "parasitize" human security, which in turn has led to a situation where human security is being undermined.

Keywords: Human Security, the Philippines, Norm Localization, Norm Breeding, Norm Parasitizing

1. Introduction

More than 25 years have passed since the concept of human security was first advocated. The concept has gradually gained support in the international community, and in 2012, the United Nations adopted a resolution on a common understanding of human security.² While the international community has been making efforts to realize human security, governments of Southeast Asian countries have rarely referred to human security or promoted policies to realize it. In Southeast Asia, many countries adhere to the principles of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs and are cautious about extending the scope of security to non-state actors.³ However,

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² A/RES/66/290.

³ Gonzalez and Mendoza 2010.

the Philippines government enacted the Human Security Act in 2007 and frequently refers to the concept of human security in its military policy plans. Why? What implications does this have? These are the questions that this paper aims to answer.

The process of interpreting globally spreading norms to suit local conditions and transforming them to make them more acceptable to local people is called localization.⁴ Localization itself tends to be thought of as an inevitable or essential phenomenon in the global diffusion of norms. Even if a norm is localized in a way that suits the actual conditions of each region, the spread of the norm globally through localization can certainly have a positive impact on the realization of that norm. In fact, some scholars argue that it is important for human security to be localized in Southeast Asia in order to be accepted in the region.⁵ Localization has tended to be viewed positively as an effort by local actors to adapt global norms to local contexts. Meanwhile, little attention has been paid to the negative aspects of localization.⁶ Even less attention has been paid to attempts by local actors to actively utilize global norms in order to achieve their own objectives.⁷ This paper sheds light on such activities by local actors. To be more specific, this paper argues that the Philippines' use of the term human security with its own, unique meaning is not an attempt to localize, but rather an attempt to "parasitize" human security, which in turn has led to a situation where human security is being undermined.

2. Human Security Norm as a Savior after the Asian Financial Crisis?

The demand for a new norm increases when facing a major security or economic crisis, systemic change, or domestic political change. An international or regional demonstration effect could also prompt norm diffusion through emulation, imitation, and contagion, and so on.⁸ The Asian financial crisis of 1997 was such a security as well as economic crisis that put strong pressure on policy makers in Southeast Asia to search for a new norm. Most Southeast Asian countries could not escape from the influence of the Thai baht's plunge. Following this currency crisis, the governments of Thailand and Indonesia collapsed. It became clear that the currency issue could endanger the survival of governments.

In December 1998, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi stated that, from the viewpoint of

⁴ Acharya 2004, 245.

⁵ Acharya 2007, 13.

⁶ Adachi 2020.

⁷ Burai 2016.

⁸ Acharya 2004, 246-7.

human security, he would urgently proceed with measures to aid the socially vulnerable who were being impacted by the Asian financial crisis. He also announced that Japan would provide 500 million yen to the United Nations to help set up a Trust Fund for Human Security.⁹ Since the UNDP began proposing the concept of human security in 1994, the concept had begun to spread internationally. While its definition had not yet been settled upon, the only thing that the variations of the human security concept had in common was that the referent of security was individual human beings. In this paper, the norm insisting that human security should be protected is called the “human security norm,” and its core element is the insistence that the referent of security should be human beings.

Accepting the human security norm and advocating for policies based on it looked attractive to policy makers in Southeast Asia because it could help to increase political support for the governments as well as financial support from countries such as Japan. In addition, Japan emphasized socio-economic development in the realization of human security,¹⁰ and such Japanese version of human security norm had the potential to be widely accepted in Southeast Asian countries. However, Southeast Asian countries did not accept, but rejected, the human security norm itself, which insists the reference of security should be human beings. Southeast Asian countries tried to avoid even using the term human security. As early as 1998, then-Foreign Minister of Thailand Surin Pitsuwan proposed holding a meeting on human security at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference. Nevertheless, Pitsuwan’s proposal did not gain support among the policy makers in ASEAN.¹¹

In Southeast Asia, the concept of comprehensive security has been widely accepted since the 1970s. In the midst of environmental problems, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and other cross-border crimes, so-called non-traditional threats have been recognized as national security issues. One of the features of the human security norm, the extension of security challenges to non-military threats, was accepted without resistance in Southeast Asia. The concept of comprehensive security, however, is different from human security in that the referent of security in comprehensive security is exclusively states, not individual human beings. This difference is of critical importance for policy makers in Southeast Asian countries. While agreeing to include non-military threats in security issues, they hesitated to recognize individual human beings as the referent of security. Some actors harbored a sense of suspicion that promoting human security might require states to relinquish their sovereignty or even invite humanitarian intervention by the Western states.¹²

⁹ Obuchi 1998.

¹⁰ Acharya 2001.

¹¹ Jumnianpol and Nuangjamnong 2015, 7.

¹² Acharya 2007, 21.

3. Breeding a New Variety Based on the Human Security Norm

The Southeast Asian region faced a series of non-military security challenges in the early 2000s. In 2003, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in China spread to Southeast Asian countries. The 2004 earthquake off Sumatra and the resulting tsunami severely damaged Southeast Asia. The importance of extending the scope of security beyond the state became clearer. Nevertheless, ASEAN policymakers remained cautious about embracing the human security norm. When local norms are strong, no matter how strong the demand for a new norm may be, it will be localized rather than accepted as it is.¹³ In Southeast Asia, the norms of respect for sovereignty and of non-interference in internal affairs are very strong. Therefore, attempts were made to localize the human security norm to fit the Southeast Asian context.

The importance of addressing non-traditional threats as advocated by the human security norm was widely accepted in Southeast Asian countries. Emphasizing the importance of addressing such issues seemed to be beneficial in enhancing the legitimacy of governments in Southeast Asian countries. The main obstacle for Southeast Asian governments to accepting the human security norm is the fact that it regards (only) individual human beings as the referent of security. A method often used to localize norms is “pruning,” which involves removing elements that do not fit the local reality.¹⁴ However, it can no longer be called the human security norm if the most important element of the norm, that the main referent of security should be individual human beings, is pruned away.

In light of this understanding, it was “norm breeding,” not norm localization, that was attempted in Southeast Asia regarding the human security norm. In other words, the usable elements of the human security norm were retained, while the elements that did not fit the local reality were “pruned” to create a new variety of security norm based on the human security norm. In this paper, this process of creating a new norm through pruning and grafting foreign norms to fit the local beliefs and practices is called “norm breeding.” Norm breeding based on the human security norm was attempted by scholars in Southeast Asia. For example, scholars led by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore proposed the concept of non-traditional security. The proponents of the concept of non-traditional security tried to maintain states as the main referent of security in order to fit the local context in Southeast Asia while recognizing non-military transnational threats as security issues.

Non-traditional security is a concept that refers to “challenges and threats to the survival and

¹³ Acharya 2004, 248.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 245.

well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources. These dangers are often transnational in scope, defying unilateral remedies and requiring comprehensive – political, economic, social – responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force.”¹⁵ The concept of non-traditional security has a lot in common with the concept of human security. Non-traditional security sees non-military threats, which are not within the scope of traditional security,¹⁶ as security issues. This departure from the concept of traditional security is in line with the concept of human security. Since most of these non-military threats are transnational in nature, non-traditional security emphasizes the inadequacy of individual states’ unilateral measures to deal with such threats. The non-traditional security norm, which insists non-traditional security should be protected, is not a localized human security norm but a new variety of security norm bred based on the human security norm. This is because it does not share the core element of the human security norm insisting that the main referent of security should be human beings. Non-traditional security regards states as the main referent of security, though it refers to individual human beings and communities as well.

There is another important difference between the non-traditional security norm and the human security norm. Non-traditional security assumes mainly states as the providers of security, while human security expects non-state actors to play roles in providing security with and sometimes without states. As most of the non-military threats are transnational in nature, they require different responses than traditional security issues. However, policy makers in Southeast Asia do not want to expand the concept of security as broadly as human security does. Expanding the concept of security to see individual human beings as the referent of security and to assume non-state actors as providers of security would significantly reduce the prominence of states. According to Caballero-Anthony, while the concept of non-traditional security shares the conceptual space of human security, non-traditional security does not privilege a singular security referent. As a concept and as an approach to security, non-traditional security recognizes the role of the state in addressing human security threats.¹⁷

Emphasizing the prominence of states, the non-traditional security norm insists on dealing with non-military and transnational issues using national and international measures. While the human security norm emphasizes the importance of empowering individuals to tackle a variety of threats, the non-traditional security norm advocates building states’ capacity to deal with these threats. In this way, the human security norm was pruned into something more acceptable to the Southeast Asian countries. The non-traditional security norm, which looks similar to the human security norm but is actually

¹⁵ Caballero-Anthony 2016, 6.

¹⁶ The traditional security concept refers to the concept of security as defending states from external military aggression by states with their militaries.

¹⁷ Caballero-Anthony 2018, 8.

quite different from it, was bred through pruning away some of the human security norm's core elements. By doing so, it attempts to respond to human security challenges to a certain extent, and in doing so, to increase the legitimacy of the governments in the region while developing significant congruence with the locally dominant concept of comprehensive security.

The non-traditional security norm is not merely a norm proposed among researchers. This norm has greatly influenced policy makers in Southeast Asia and been actually institutionalized in the ASEAN community building process.¹⁸ The ASEAN Charter does not use the term non-traditional security, but it states “to respond effectively, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, transnational crimes and transboundary challenges” as one of the ASEAN's purposes. At first glance, it seems that the ASEAN Charter refused to accept not only the human security norm but also the non-traditional security norm. However, the preamble of the Charter declares ASEAN's resolution to put people at the center of ASEAN's community building project. The Charter also includes enhancing the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN as one of the ASEAN purposes.¹⁹ The policy makers of ASEAN emphasized the importance of the welfare of the people repeatedly²⁰ and tried to increase the legitimacy of the member governments, while at the same time keeping the initiative in the hands of the state.²¹ This is why the ASEAN Charter codifies ASEAN's state-centrism despite the preamble's resolution to put people at the center of ASEAN's community building project and its promotion of a people-oriented ASEAN as one of the Association's purposes. It can be said that the institutional design of the ASEAN Community was based on the non-traditional security norm.²²

4. Accepting the New Variety: The Non-traditional Security Norm in the Philippines

The Philippines was reluctant to embrace human security norms. Nevertheless, unlike other Southeast Asian countries, the Philippine government has become proactive in mentioning human

¹⁸ For an analysis of how researchers and civil society organizations influenced the content of the ASEAN Charter through their exchanges of views with the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, see Igarashi 2018, 113-125; Collins 2013, 68-78.

¹⁹ ASEAN 2008, Article 1.

²⁰ Morada 2008, 42.

²¹ Collins 2008, 325.

²² This point can be seen more clearly when we look at how the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) was designed. As Caballero-Anthony notes, the APSC's conceptualization of security constitutes “a departure from the dominant security discourse in the region, in which ‘comprehensive security’ has been characterized by its perception of the state as the primary security referent. Thus, NTS could be considered as the broader umbrella that is bringing in issues of human security since its security referent extends beyond the state to include individuals and societies” (Caballero-Anthony 2010, 6-7).

security at the governmental level. Why? What implications does this have? Let us examine it in more detail below.

In the Philippines, as in other Southeast Asian countries, so-called non-traditional threats have been recognized as national security issues. One of the features of the human security concept, the extension of security challenges to non-military threats, was accepted without resistance in the Philippines. There were also signs of an attempt to extend the referent of security beyond the state. In fact, through the redefinition of the concept of national security after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, human beings, in addition to the state and the political system, came to be regarded as the referent of security.²³ However, human beings are only considered to be a component of the state and not equal to the state in terms of security. Although the Philippines no longer limited its security agenda to military threats, the state remained the main referent of security during Corazón Aquino and Fidel Valdez Ramos administrations.²⁴

When the UNDP started to promote the human security norm, the Philippines had been facing a national security crisis. After the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992, China became more assertive around the Spratly Islands, occupying and building a concrete structure on the Mischief Reef that the Philippines claims sovereignty over. Therefore, during the Ramos administration and the Estrada administration, the referent of security was largely limited to the state.²⁵ After President Estrada was impeached by Congress for alleged financial irregularities and stepped down as president following the Second EDSA Revolution, his successor, President Arroyo, emphasized the importance of people and made the fight against poverty a top priority.²⁶ Nevertheless, President Arroyo always used the slogan “Strong Republic,” and the fight against poverty was pursued through the strengthening of state institutions.

When the 9/11 simultaneous terrorist attacks occurred, the Philippines, which also had a domestic terrorism problem, was quick to emphasize the relationship between terrorism and poverty and to place it in the context of the fight against poverty, making counterterrorism the top priority for the government. Similarly, Arroyo emphasized that the Philippines were at war with kidnapping and drug trafficking and called for efforts to address these as well for the “welfare of our people.”²⁷ While addressing a variety of issues other than military affairs as part of her security policy and adding people to the referent of security, Arroyo maintained the state as the main referent and provider of security.²⁸

²³ Cabilo and Baviera 2010, 34.

²⁴ Valencia-Santelices 2013, 60.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 78; 91.

²⁶ Macapagal-Arroyo, 2001; Macapagal-Arroyo, 2002.

²⁷ Macapagal-Arroyo, 2002.

²⁸ Valencia-Santelices 2013, 99.

She repeated the importance of building a “strong republic” in order to protect the welfare of the people from various non-traditional threats. It can be safely said that Arroyo embraced the non-traditional security norm.

5. Parasitizing Human Security?

On September 23, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government issued Executive Order No. 13224, which listed the Mindanao-based Abu Sayyaf among the international terrorist organizations. The need arose for the Philippine government to cooperate with the U.S.-led war on terror, and the Philippines government faced pressure to enact an anti-terrorism law. In November 2001, the House of Representatives started debating the Anti-Terrorism Bill (House Bill No. 3802). However, consideration of this bill in the Senate did not proceed smoothly due to criticism that it violated human rights. After Abu Sayyaf’s statement of responsibility for the February 2005 bombings in Metro Manila, President Arroyo designated the Anti-Terrorism Bill as a bill that should be urgently discussed. In 2007, the Anti-Terrorism Law was finally enacted.

The official title of this law was “An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism,” with its short title being the “Human Security Act of 2007 (section 1).” As stated in the short title, it lists people as well as the state as targets to be protected, and it condemns terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the country and to the welfare of the people (section 2). Nevertheless, except for the title, the law made no reference to human security itself. On the contrary, there was great concern that this law could have negative impacts on human security.²⁹ The law allowed authorities to arrest terror suspects without warrants and to temporarily detain them without charges for up to three days. In addition, this law allowed the government to label some organizations as terrorists or as conspiring with terrorists. Such labeling could be used to stifle dissent, suppress political opponents, or intimidate legitimate organizations.³⁰ In any case, it was clear that the purpose of the Human Security Act was not to improve human security, but to strengthen anti-terrorism measures under U.S. pressure amid the U.S.-led war on terror.³¹

The Philippines government basically assumed the state as both the subject and the referent of security. Why, then, did the Act dare to use the term human security, which the Philippine government

²⁹ Arugay 2012, 38.

³⁰ Ibid. Five advocacy groups in the Philippines petitioned the Philippine Supreme Court to strike this law for being unconstitutionally vague. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

³¹ Labog-Javellana 2007.

had avoided mentioning³² Advancing counterterrorism measures would, of course, have a positive impact on human security. However, in President Arroyo's speech at the launching of the Human Security Act of 2007, the term human security almost never appeared, except in the name of the law. The only reference to human security was in the sentence, "Economic and social development is still the best guarantee of achieving human security." Arroyo avoided touching on how counterterrorism measures affect human security, but rather emphasized the point that poverty alleviation, or policies that enhance human security, could also help fight against terrorism, saying "Poverty, though not the cause, abets terrorism."

The Anti-Terrorism Bill discussed at the Senate had been criticized both internationally and domestically for its potential to violate human rights. Therefore, it might have been an attempt to dodge international criticism by naming the law after human security, which was gaining ground among Western countries critical of human rights violations. At the same time, it was also an attempt to soften domestic criticism by emphasizing its relationship to a human security issue, poverty alleviation, while avoiding mentioning the potential impact of the law on human security. Arroyo also argued that terrorists "lack all humanity and concern for the people." By dehumanizing terrorists, she hinted that the violations of human rights of terrorists were not a problem for human security.³³ The enactment of the Human Security Act did not indicate the acceptance of the human security norm. Rather, it merely referred to the human security norm without accepting the norm. In this paper, such an act of referring to a norm that the actor does not embrace for the actor's own advantage, such as enhancing the actor's own legitimacy, by parasitizing on the good image of the globally spread norm is called "norm parasitism."³⁴

Parasitizing human security norm continued under the Benigno Aquino III administration. The Aquino administration's stance was in line with the non-traditional security norm, as the importance of dealing with non-traditional threats was pointed out and individuals were mentioned in addition to the state as a referent of security.³⁵ However, the *Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP)*, prepared by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), frequently refers to human security. For example, the *IPSP* adopted the Whole-of-Nation Approach and the People-Centered Security/Human Security Approach.³⁶ Notably, the *IPSP* also pointed out that its definition of human security is based on the

³² Atienza 2015.

³³ Arroyo 2007.


³⁴ A concept similar to norm parasitism is mimetic adoption of a norm. Mimetic adoption refers to the behavior of adopting a globally spread norm in order to enhance one's own legitimacy. However, actors who mimetically adopt a globally spread norm embraces it, albeit strategically, and is expected to have a positive effect on norm diffusion. Katsumata 2011.

³⁵ National Security Council 2011, 24.

³⁶ Armed Forces of the Philippines 2010, 24.

UN conceptualization and not on the view of the Human Security Act of 2007.³⁷

Figure 1. Responses to Norm Diffusion by Local Agents



(Source) Author

Did the *IPSP* reflect the acceptance of the human security norm by the AFP? During the Arroyo administration, there was growing dissatisfaction among younger military officers with the corruption that prevailed among senior military officers. This dissatisfaction was further heightened by the revelation of senior military officers' involvement in electoral fraud by the Arroyo campaign during the 2004 presidential elections. Under these circumstances, there were frequent coup attempts during the Arroyo administration.³⁸ In addition, extrajudicial executions increased sharply after Arroyo took office. The involvement of the AFP in such extrajudicial executions came to light,³⁹ leading to mounting domestic and international criticism of the AFP.⁴⁰ As corruption and human rights abuses in the AFP came under intense criticism, the need to improve the AFP's image was recognized among top AFP officers such as Eduardo Oban Jr., then the AFP's Chief of Staff, who noted that "the AFP should strive to build a positive image to correct the perception of being a human rights violator."⁴¹

Under the newly installed administration of Benigno Aquino III, the AFP embarked on reforms. The inclusion of civil society organizations and researchers in the process of writing a new internal security plan was symbolic. The reference to respect for human rights and international humanitarian law as well as the adoption of the Human Security Approach in the *IPSP* are the result of the

³⁷ Ibid., 2 note 3.

³⁸ Yamane 2014, Chapter 7 and Chapter 9.

³⁹ Human Rights Watch 2007.

⁴⁰ For example, in a public poll conducted by Pulse Asia in February and March 2011, 49% of respondents answered that the AFP was the most corrupt government agency. This was far ahead of the second-placed Philippines National Police (26%) (*Philippines Daily Inquirer*, 2011).

⁴¹ Yamane 2014, 274.

involvement of these civil society organizations.⁴² However, the fact that the *ISPS* adopted the Human Security Approach did not necessarily mean that the AFP accepted the human security norm.

The end state articulated in the *IPSP* is to reduce the capabilities of internal armed threats to a level where they can no longer threaten the stability of the state and to ensure the safety and well-being of the Filipino people. The goals stated in the *IPSP* include the success of the peace process, the defeat of armed threat groups, and the establishment of conditions for civil authorities to take responsibility for the safety and well-being of their constituents. The *IPSP* regarded the AFP as the main actor to protect human security, stating that it is “crucial to broaden the ‘protector’ function assigned to the institution to one that promotes [not only] national security, but more importantly, human security.”⁴³ Even though the *IPSP* frequently refers to human security, it is based on the non-traditional security norm, not on the human security norm.

It is true that the *IPSP* refers to supporting developmental, environmental protection, disaster risk reduction and management, and law enforcement activities as one of the AFP’s objectives. However, undertaking such missions is nothing new for the AFP. The AFP has been engaged in missions such as infrastructure development and the provision of public services since the 1950s.⁴⁴ Development efforts as part of counterinsurgency operations have been consistent since then. With the rapid expansion of communist forces after the end of the Marcos administration, combat and non-combat operations including development were viewed as inseparable in counterinsurgency operations during the Corazón Aquino administration. In this vein, during the Estrada and Arroyo administrations, an internal security plan that incorporated the development mission of the AFP was formulated and implemented.⁴⁵

It is true that the *IPSP* frequently refers to human security and that the AFP has been addressing human security issues to some degree. However, the subject and referent of security in the *IPSP* remains basically the state. The AFP began to refer to human security only as a result of the writing of the *IPSP* with the participation of civil society in order to improve its own image. It can be said that the norm parasitism continues, with references to human security norms made for the purpose of improving the AFP’s image without accepting the norm.

⁴² Yamane 2014, 276-277.

⁴³ Armed Forces of the Philippines 2010, 2.

⁴⁴ Hernandez 1979, 194-196; Acop 2013, 100-101.

⁴⁵ Yamane 2014, 209-223.

6. Increased Human Insecurity

Philippines' national security policy has continued to be formulated based on non-traditional security since Rodrigo Duterte came to power. *The National Security Policy 2017-2022* refers to people as the referent of security in addition to the state. That document defines security as “a state or condition wherein the people’s welfare, well-being, and ways of life; government and its institutions; territorial integrity; sovereignty; and core values are enhanced and protected.”⁴⁶ In addition, Chapter 6 lists a 12-point national security agenda, in which “Human and Political Security” comes first. In this regard, it appears that the Duterte administration is trying to strengthen its concern for the security of the people.

However, this “Human and Political Security” is, of course, not synonymous with human security. That section explains that human and political security is “an important element to protect the core of human lives and institutions in ways that enhance peace, unity, freedom, democracy, and people’s dignity.”⁴⁷ It is important to keep in mind that protecting institutions in ways that enhance unity can be diametrically opposed to enhancing human security.

In the chapter on National Security Interests (Chapter 3), “Public Safety, Law and Order, and Justice” is listed first. Again, at first glance, the Duterte administration’s focus seems to be on enhancing people’s safety. It should be noted, however, that even here, it declares that “the most fundamental duties of the State are to ensure public safety [and] maintain law and order...” and that “the Government seeks to enhance its capacity to execute the above mandate.”⁴⁸ Similarly, “law and order and administration of justice” is listed at the top of the internal security challenges, and “strengthen[ing] public safety, law and order, and the administration of justice” is listed first among the goals and strategic objectives in *The National Security Policy 2017-2022*.⁴⁹

The national security policy of the Duterte era is characterized by its emphasis on public safety and law and order as key security issues. It also stresses the need to clean up and strengthen the criminal justice system to meet these challenges. *The National Security Policy 2017-2022* also states that the “Government is primarily accountable to the people and must ensure that a just, stable, and peaceful society is achieved.” Moreover, it says that “developing a credible defense and law enforcement capability is a crucial cornerstone of national security,” while also hinting that the

⁴⁶ National Security Council 2017, 2.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 9 and 19, respectively.

Philippines should increase its defense budget.⁵⁰ It is safe to say that Duterte assumes the state as the primary security provider and the society, not individual people, as the main referent of security.

The same is true with the new internal security plan, the *AFP Development Support and Security Plan 2017-2022 (DSSP)*, which succeeded the *IPSP*. As in the *IPSP*, civil society organizations were involved in the preparation process of the *DSSP*. As a result, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law were incorporated in it. However, unlike the *IPSP*, which adopted the Human Security Approach, the *DSSP* adopts the Development-Governance-Security approach. The *DSSP* does refer to human security, stating that “the security mandate of the AFP must be performed in the context of human security.”⁵¹ However, unlike the early years of the Aquino III administration, when the AFP was desperate to restore its public image, the AFP did not need to actively refer to the human security norm, as its image has improved dramatically. The population’s net satisfaction with the AFP, meaning the percentage of satisfied minus dissatisfied, rose to 67% in March 2017 from 14% in March 2011.⁵² Therefore, while the *DSSP* emphasizes the fact that the AFP engages in noncombat missions in addition to combat missions, it does not make as many references to human security as the *IPSP* did. The *DSSP* clarifies that the referent of security is the state.

One of the administration’s top priority policies was the fight against drugs. Dealing with the drug problem is often seen as a human security issue. Duterte initiated an anti-drug campaign, insisting that the Philippines was in the midst of a “drug emergency.”⁵³ The Duterte administration, however, saw the drug problem as closely linked to crime and violence,⁵⁴ and hence it tried to deal with the drug problem by criminalizing it rather than from the perspective of human security. In his speech at Camp Peralta, Duterte said, “I don’t mind these human rights; I have a problem to solve, and that is the drug problem in our country” and issued a “shoot-to-kill” order against narco-politicians.⁵⁵ He even urged ordinary Filipinos to kill suspected criminals.⁵⁶ This is a typical attempt to securitize⁵⁷ the drug problem. By transforming the drug issue into a matter of security, Duterte attempted to enable the use of extraordinary means in the name of security.⁵⁸ The military was often mobilized in his “war on drugs.”⁵⁹ Using military personnel for civilian policing anywhere heightens the risk of unnecessary or excessive force and inappropriate military tactics. Such policies lead to endangering human security

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁵¹ Armed Forces of Philippines 2016, 31.

⁵² Social Weather Station 2019.

⁵³ Human Rights Watch 2017, 31.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁵ Bencito 2016.

⁵⁶ *The Guardian* 2016, July 1.

⁵⁷ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde 1998, 25.

⁵⁸ Utama 2021.

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch 2017, 36.

especially when they are based on the non-traditional security norm, not on the human security norm, whose main referent of security is the state.

The Duterte administration, while frequently referring to exaggerated or inaccurate data,⁶⁰ succeeded in making the public accept the securitization of the drug problem. While President Duterte was accused internationally of excessive human rights violations and extrajudicial killings in his war on drugs, he continued to enjoy a high approval rating domestically, despite the very large number of casualties stemming from the war on drugs.⁶¹ Still, high domestic approval ratings did not mean that Duterte's war on drugs was working. While all crimes dropped by 9.8%, killings rose by 22.75% during President Duterte's first year in office.⁶² As Utama suggested, the impact of Duterte's war on drugs has been "human rights abuses (right to due process), extrajudicial killings, and a climate of impunity, causing homicide and murder rates to skyrocket."⁶³ Moreover, it is overwhelmingly the urban poor who were targeted by the war on drugs and these killings. Duterte succeeded in winning the support of the rich and middle class through this "war on the poor."⁶⁴ However, his popularity was high among the poor, too. That is because Duterte claimed that he can save the law-abiding "moral citizens" by impressing upon them that the "immoral others" who did not follow the law were being punished by his "war on drugs."⁶⁵

Ultimately, it can be said that Duterte's war on drugs was an attempt to give the impression that he was enhancing the security of "moral citizens" by sacrificing the human security of "immoral others." The Duterte administration has added people to the referent of security, emphasizing "human and political security" as one of the 12 important security agendas. However, for Duterte, "people" were limited to moral citizens. By dividing the poor into "probationary citizens worth being saved" and "worthless and helpless poor," he legitimized the latter's execution.⁶⁶

The non-traditional security norm emphasizes the state and the community rather than the individual as the referent of security. It is true that many human security agendas have been addressed based on the non-traditional security norm. However, the non-traditional security norm made it possible to justify threatening the human security of some people for the sake of the security of the state. And it is the Duterte administration that has carried this out in a very extreme manner. In the Philippines, the non-traditional security norm bred based on the human security norm has led to

⁶⁰ Baldwin and Marshall 2016.

⁶¹ Social Weather Stations 2021.

⁶² Talabong 2017.

⁶³ Utama 2021, 52-53.

⁶⁴ Jun You 2018, 56.

⁶⁵ Kusaka 2017, 65-67; Utama 2021, 43.

⁶⁶ Kusaka, *ibid.*

extreme human insecurity for some of the marginalized people labeled “immoral.”

With the spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), it became increasingly justifiable to violate the rights of some “immoral others” for the sake of the security of the state and community.⁶⁷ The enactment in July 2020 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, which replaced the Human Security Act, is symbolic. Not only has the term human security disappeared, but the new anti-terrorism law has been criticized both domestically and internationally for potentially enabling more human rights abuses.⁶⁸ The non-traditional security norm as well as the parasitized human security norm has now become completely incompatible with the human security norm, both in name and reality.

7. Concluding Remarks

Norms and concepts that spread globally are not always accepted as is by all countries. Rather, it is important for them to be localized to suit the actual conditions of each country or region. Sometimes important parts of a norm are pruned to breed a new variety. Whether localized or newly bred norms based on the original norm, their dissemination can contribute to some extent to the realization of the original norms at the global level. And this point has been viewed rather positively so far. However, depending on how it is localized or bred, it may have an adverse effect. We need to be careful about how people behave and what policies are implemented based on localized or newly bred norms based on the original norm. They can sometimes be counterproductive, preventing the realization of the original norm. The effects of localization, breeding, or parasitizing of the norm have not been sufficiently studied, and further research is needed in that respect.

⁶⁷ Hapal 2021.

⁶⁸ Regino 2020.

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