Foreword

The study of norms – how they emerge, spread and influence the behavior of people and states – is no longer a new area in International Relations (IR). But there still remain gaps in the literature and hence opportunities for creative and exciting research to fill these gaps. Professor Kenki Adachi's book, *Changing Arms Control Norms in International Society*, is one such outstanding effort.

The theory of Constructivism, in which much of the research and debate on norm diffusion is situated, is relatively new, especially compared to Realism and Liberalism, two of the major approaches that have historically dominated the field of IR. Like these two theories, Constructivism emerged in the West in the 1990s, especially with the work of Alexander Wendt, although its assumptions and arguments had been foreshadowed in earlier theories, including the "international society" perspective that developed in the UK (also known as the "English School" of IR), and in other disciplines, particularly the "structuration" theory of sociology. At its birth, Constructivism in general and the study of norm dynamics (i.e., origins, spread and impact of norms) in particular, remained Western centric; taking footholds mainly in the US and Europe. No surprises here; this has been the case with IR as a whole. One would have expected that a theory that emerged relatively late, when decolonization had already been substantially accomplished, with the number of independent states and people living in the non-Western world vastly outnumbering those in the West, would account for the normative aspirations and agency of the "new" states. But not so; the early norm literature also focused almost exclusively on the moral proselytism of Western "norm entrepreneurs," and on issues of concern to Western societies. At the same time, their efforts were deemed to have a universal relevance, creating global normative structure in which non-Western countries, including relatively large ones such as India and China or wealthy ones like Japan, were cast in the role of passive pupils, rather than active builders and contributors.

Subsequent critique and research on norms have shown the explanatory limitations of this approach and revealed a more complex picture. It has shown that contributions to global norm creation and diffusion process come from many difference places, involving diverse actors and more importantly, these contributions can take multiple forms or types of agency. Especially important are cases where states, societies and individuals who consciously choose to accept certain norms while rejecting

others, and/or modify those they accept to fit their own context and need. This process, which is called "constitutive localization," is an authentic and ubiquitous form of normative agency.

Professor Adachi's book falls within such efforts to broaden the discussion of actors and agency in norm dynamics. It investigates, from a deeply historical and theoretical perspective, how the norm against weapons emerged and diffused. Although comparative in scope, many readers will find its discussion of Japan especially interesting and important, since the early history of Japan's response to international norms is poorly known or understood in the West, and in the wider IR norm literature generally.

The picture that emerges from this book is that the norm against weapons (and I would add that all modern norms) has multiple civilizational origins. Professor Adachi mentions Indian sage Manu's prohibition against certain types of weapons and the use of weapons in general against certain type of targets, including civilians, wounded, and unarmed combatants. But the European principles and practices against weapons-use became globally influential, thanks to the rise of Europe in the age of imperialism, and its corollary, the "standard of civilization" principle. That principle, which became the foundation of modern international law, was aggressively racial and self-legitimizing for Europe's global dominance. It had nothing to do with "civilization" in its usual cultural or ideational sense. Rather, it had political and strategic purpose, which judged countries in terms of their largely material ability to provide law and order (mainly the security for the life and property of Europeans living in their territories), and develop the capacity not only to defend themselves, but also to participate in imperial operations beyond their borders (sometimes in cooperation with the European and Western powers). As such, some of the earliest and most advanced civilizations in the world, including India, China and Egypt, were judged to have fallen short of the European "standard of civilization" and hence excluded from the "international society" that the European claimed to have constructed, and were thereby deemed worthy of colonization and dominance.

The concept of "international society" that Europe's claimed to have pioneered is a flawed and Eurocentric notion, not the least because it ignores other "societies" developed earlier or prior civilizations, from the Amarna period of the mid-2nd millennium BC to the East Asian system featuring China and its neighbors, including Japan, before the rise of Europe. Professor Adachi justifiably uses the term "inter-state society," since it accommodates inter-state relations before and beyond the European nation-state, a term which gave the name to "international" society and "international" relations. But flawed as it might have been, the European state-system also provided opportunities for some well-organized countries to assert their identity and role in world politics. Japan was foremost among them. By adopting norms developed in Europe, Japan could advance its claim to membership in the European-organized "international society." This had both unfortunate and positive consequences. The former is well-known, including the history of Japan's own imperialism. But the desire to emulate Europe's anti-weapon norm also helped to expand that norm's reach globally, and created an additional and powerful site of normative agency in world politics. This became especially important as Japan

rehabilitated itself after World War II, becoming a respected and highly influential member of the international or global community (a term which has replaced the European notion of "international society"), and a consequential normative actor promoting norms such as in arms control and human security issues.

Against this backdrop, Professor Adachi's book, using a Euro-Japanese historical context but going well beyond it, makes a number of contributions. It advances the theory of norm diffusion in multiple respects. It shows that the spread of moral ideas or norms to regulate specific weapons is not an exclusively European phenomenon. This is a powerful claim of non-Western agency in the development of the modern world order.

Professor Adachi's book also contributes to the understanding of micro mechanisms of norm diffusion, including "norm localization," with its emphasis on grafting and cognitive priors. One interesting aspect of the book is its discussion of the notions and practices of chivalry in medieval Europe, which Prof Adachi employs to trace the origin of modern anti-weapon norms, and which is not well articulated even in the European literature on norms. But going beyond this, the book shows that in Japan where chivalry was not historically common or shared, norms against certain weapons, especially the one against gun usage, emerged and was widely accepted when it could be grafted it onto Bushido, the Samurai code of honor.

Furthermore, the book offers an excellent example of the "Banyan model" of norm diffusion originally developed by me but given succinct definition by Professor Adachi: "where a variety of norms in different countries influence the construction of a norm in inter-state society." The book's comparative discussion of norm diffusion processes in Japan, China, Thailand and Turkey adds to its depth and analytical value. This attention to the multiplicity of non-Western agency renders this book a major contribution to the growing attention to Global IR, or the attempt to redefine and broaden the study of International Relations beyond its Eurocentric roots and Western dominance.

Last but not the least, we get a sense from this book of the challenges posed by non-state actors, which are increasingly both numerous and influential in world politics, to the spread and maintenance of norms against certain types of weapons.

To sum up, this book should be read by anyone interested in adding richness and depth to the study of International Relations in general and to Constructivist theory on norm dynamics in particular. It is a significant step forward in writings by non-Western scholars on IR theorizing. It offers novel insights into origins and evolution of the anti-weapon norm, which remains a work-in-progress. Along with its historical focus, the book is immensely policy relevant to understanding present and future debates and action in controlling armaments and managing the militarization of the world.

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